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FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES:
A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years Congress has become increasingly concerned over the profitability
of criminal activity. With the enactment of both the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act' (RICO) and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute2
(CCE) in 1970, Congress intended to attack the economic base of persons involved
in organized crime and illegal drugs. Both of these statutes contain criminal forfeiture
provisions3 which enhance the effectiveness of the law enforcement community in
stripping offenders of their ill-gained profits. Rather than relying on the traditional
penalties of fine and imprisonment to deter illegal activity, forfeiture provisions
concentrate on the property acquired by a defendant through criminal actions.
However, due to ambiguities and limitations in those forfeiture statutes, they were
rarely used.
In an attempt to improve the usefulness of the statutes, Congress in 1984
amended the forfeiture provisions. 4 One amendment provides that property subject
to forfeiture vests in the hands of the government at the time the illegal act takes
place. Under this amendment, the government's interest does not necessarily ex-
tinguish when the defendant transfers his interest to a third party., Thus, for the
first time, funds which have been transferred by a defendant to his attorney in
payment of legal fees became subject to criminal forfeiture. 6 Many defense attorneys
believe, however, that these new provisions may violate a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. In addition, ethical considerations such as infringement upon
the attorney-client privilege, violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and other serious conflicts of interest are raised by this statute.
This note will present an analysis of issues surrounding the forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees and will include a review of recent cases that have addressed this con-
troversy. Part One will present a brief outline of the scope of forfeiture provisions,
with special emphasis on the 1984 amendments to the forfeiture statutes. Part Two
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985) (amending 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (West
1970)).
2 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985) (amending 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (1970)).
' 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985).
See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (West Supp. 1985). Criminal forfeiture acts as a criminal penalty against
a person convicted of a punishable offense. It does not forfeit a person's whole estate, but instead
operates against specific property interests derived from the criminal enterprise. For a discussion of
in personam versus in rem forfeiture see generally, The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) i (1827); Clark,
Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L.
REv. 379 (1976).
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301, reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1837, 2040.
* 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A.,§ 853 (c) (West Supp. 1985).
See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing the relation back theory). However,
the relation back doctrine has long been used in civil forfeitures. See Simons v. United States, 541
F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
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will examine the recent judicial decisions on this subject. Parts Three and Four
will respectively address the problems raised by the courts and suggest solutions
to those problems.
II. THE SCOPE OF FORFEITURE AND THE CFA
Criminal forfeiture is a relatively new phenomenon in federal law,7 having been
introduced with the RICO and CCE statutes in 1970. Unlike an in rem forfeiture,8
this type of forfeiture is an in personam proceeding against the defendant based
on an adjudication of criminal guilt.' Criminal forfeiture must be alleged in the
indictment,'" and upon conviction, a special verdict must be entered against the
defendant." As a general rule, forfeitable assets remain in the hands of the defen-
dant prior to conviction. Only after conviction is the government authorized to
seize the property.' 2
Congress had hoped that this new form of penal sanction would become a
major tool in fighting organized crime and drug trafficking. Unfortunately, the
absence of clearly defined procedures and other statutory ambiguities in the original
forfeiture statutes impeded the attainment of this objective. The judicial system
then became responsible for construing the provisions of the statutes.' 3 The results
7 This type of forfeiture has existed under the English common law since Medieval times. For-
feitures in personam, or forfeitures of estate, was an added penalty against a person convicted of a
felony. See Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, I N. ILL. U.L,
REV. 225, 229-30 (1981), quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 354 (New ed. 1813). In the United
States, the first Congress abolished this type of forfeiture. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 24, 1 Stat.
117 (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)). From that date until 1970, no statute had provided
for in personam forfeiture as a criminal penalty.
I An in rem forfeiture is taken directly against the offending property, rather than against the
person. This type of forfeiture is considered a civil proceeding. A civil forfeiture allows the property
to be seized immediately. The case must be brought in the jurisdiction where the property is located.
The standard of proof in a civil forfeiture is "the preponderance of the evidence" and generally the
guilt or innocence of the owner of the asset is irrelevant. A civil forfeiture proceeding may be used
against assets used in drug violations. See 21 U.S.C. § 881. In some circumstances, it may be desirable
for the prosecution to proceed against the asset civilly rather than criminally. In rem forfeiture has
been extensively used in the United States. See Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 790-792 (1977).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(0 (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West Supp. 1985). In addition
the CCE provides for a rebuttable presumption that property acquired by a convicted person is subject
to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(d) (West Supp. 1985). Section 1963 does not provide such a pre-
sumption.
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2).
, See, e.g., United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), vacated, 464 U.S. 979, mod.
ified, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1983) (property forfeitable does not include proceeds of racketeering ac-
tivity); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (restraining orders); United States
v. Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189, 192 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1983) (third party must
file claim with Attorney General).
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were confusing and disappointing. In an effort to correct the problems, Congress
sought to implement new, clearer guidelines for criminal forfeitures." The most
significant of these amendments with respect to the forfeiture of attorneys' fees
will be discussed below.
A. Forfeitability of the Proceeds of Criminal Activity
The 1984 Criminal Forfeiture Act (CFA) both clarifies and expands the type
of property that may be subject to forfeiture under RICO and CCE. For RICO
violations, the CFA explicitly sets out various interests that may be forfeited.' 5
In the statute the word "property" is defined to include realty, personalty, and
intangible personal property." Most importantly, the CFA settled the question of
whether the proceeds of criminal activity are forfeitable.
Prior to the enactment of the CFA, several courts had held that the criminal
forfeiture provisions of RICO were limited to interests in the enterprise and did
not apply to income derived from that enterprise.' 7 However, the Fifth Circuit had
reached the opposite conclusion.'" The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the conflict. In Russello v. United States," the Court reviewed
the legislative history and structure of RICO. It concluded that "construing section
1963(a)(1) to reach only interests in an enterprise would blunt the effectiveness of
the provision in combatting illegal enterprises. ' 20 The Court found that all pro-
ceeds, whether direct or derivative, were forfeitable interests under the statute.2'
Thus, the CFA merely codified the holding in Russello.2
For drug offenses, the CFA makes the new forfeiture sections applicable to
all felony drug offenses. 23 Previously, only the CCE statute had provided for criminal
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, supra note 4.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a)(l)-(2)(D) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
(a) whoever violates any provision of section 1962 ... shall forfeit to the Untied States
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962.
(2) any-
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(b) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(b) (Vest Supp. 1985).
" See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled, United States
v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985); McManigal, 708 F.2d 276; United States v. Marubeni Amer-
ica Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
" United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd. Russello, 464 U.S. 16.
Russello, 464 U.S. 16.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West Supp. 1985).
19861
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forfeiture." The statute also provides that forfeitable property is deemed to in-
clude the "proceeds" rather than the "profits" of the illegal operation." This word
was deliberately chosen in order to alleviate the need for the government to prove
net profits.26 The statute also borrowed the language "any of the property used
or intended to be used" from the civil forfeiture statute27 in an attempt to broaden
the scope of property subject to forfeiture.
The CFA extends the classes of property which may be forfeited, including
indirect profits. In the context of attorney fees, the defense attorney should be
aware of the source of funds from which his fee is to be paid. If the government
can show that the money was derived from the proceeds of criminal activity, those
funds may be seized.
B. The Taint Theory
Congress was also concerned that the RICO and CCE statutes failed to ad-
dress the problem of a defendant avoiding forfeiture by transferring, selling, or
otherwise disposing of his assets prior to conviction. 28 Under the old statutes, the
only method available to prevent such actions was a post-indictment restraining
order. 29 The requirements for obtaining a restraining order were quite stringent,
thus making it difficult to assure the availability of the assets. ° In addition, the
forfeiture provisions did not prevent the target of an investigation from anticipating
the forfeiture action,3' thereby giving a defendant time to dispose of his assets before
any action could be taken against him.
To deal with this problem, Congress applied the taint theory, which had long
been used in civil forfeiture cases. 2 Under this theory, assets are forfeited at the
time of the commission of the illegal acts. The government's interest in that prop-
-' 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
25 Cf. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 848(a)(2)(A) to 853(a) (West Supp. 1985).
11 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 193, reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws
3182, 3382 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
2- Cf. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 853(a)(2) to 881(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
2 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 26, at 3378.
- 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(b) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(d) (West Supp. 1985).
"' Some courts had held that the standard in obtaining the restraining order was the same stand-
ard required in civil litigation under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65 provides
that the moving party must show irreparable harm will result from non-issuance of the order. The
adverse party is entitled to a full hearing on the merits of the restraining order. See, e.g., United States
v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984) (defendant is entitled to a
full hearing concerning the issuance of a restraining order including the right to cross-examine); United
States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3rd Cir. 1981) (government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that it will prevail od the merits and that the assets are subject to forfeiture).
11 This is especially true where grand jury investigation is underway. Unlike civil forfeiture, where
property may be seized immediately, the assets remain with the defendant until conviction, providing
him with an opportunity to conceal assets.
32 See, e.g. Stowell,'133 U.S. 1; Simons, 541 F.2d at 1352. However, until the CFA, the taint
theory had never been applied to in personam forfeitures.
[Vol. 88
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erty relates back to that time, and all subsequent transactions are voidable.33 The
intent of this provision is to prevent the defendant from purposely transferring
his forfeitable property to a third party in order to avoid forfeiture.34 This amend-
ment was added to assist the government in preserving forfeitable assets until a
conviction could be obtained. The relation back provision is the basis for the thorny
problem of forfeiture of attorneys' fees. If a defendant pays his attorney from
tainted funds, the government has an interest in those funds which is not extinguished
because the funds are in the hands of his attorney. These funds, according to the
statute, may be forfeited.
C. Claims of Third Parties
Section 1963(c) provides for the forfeiture of property where the accused has
transferred his assets in an effort to avoid the economic consequences of forfeiture. 31
However, because an innocent purchaser may have acquired a forfeitable asset subse-
quent to the illegal act, the CFA provides for an ancilliary hearing to adjudicate
the claims of third parties asserting an interest in the property to be forfeited. 36
Prior to the enactment of this provision, a third party was required to petition
the Attorney General for relief.3 The Attorney General's decision regarding such
petitions was discretionary and nonreviewable.35 Because third parties could not
take part in the criminal trial, they had no way to challenge the validity of the
forfeiture order. Thus, a hearing, popularly known as a section (m) hearing, may
be provided for judicial review of third party claims.
Under the new procedure, the court may consolidate all third party claims aris-
ing from the same order of forfeiture.39 A third party will prevail if he proves
that he falls into one of two categories: first, if his claim in interest is superior
to the defendant's at the time of the acts giving rise to the forfeiture or, second,
if he is a bona fide purchaser and had no reason to believe the property was sub-
ject to forfeiture. 0 The burden of proof is on the third party to prove his claim
by a preponderance of the evidence."'
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1985).
' "The purpose of this provision is to permit voiding of certain preconviction transfers and so
close a potential loophole in current law whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be avoided by
transfers that were not 'arms length' transactions." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 23 at 3384.
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985). The statute provides that "any [forfeitable] property
that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special
verdict of forfeiture . . ." 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1985) contains a similar provision.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (West Supp. 1985).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); See also Mandel, 505 F. Supp. 189 (approving this
procedure).
1H Mandel, 505 F. Supp. at 191-92.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m)(4) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m)(6) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
" The third party has the burden of proof because the government has already established the
forfeitability of the property in the criminal trial.
1986]
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This hearing provides an important procedural function with regard to attorneys'
fees. If the funds used to pay the attorney are adjudged forfeitable, the attorney
can petition the court for a hearing on the matter. If the attorney can prove that
he falls under one of the categories in the statute, the forfeiture order will be
amended. On the other hand, disclosure by an attorney in a section (in) hearing
of information concerning the source of his fee may go beyond the scope of the
attorney-client privilege.
III. SURVEY OF CASELAW
Since the enactment of the CFA, forfeitures of attorneys' fees increasingly have
become an integral part of RICO and CCE prosecutions.4" Accordingly, courts
are just beginning to consider the issues relating to criminal forfeiture. The CFA
dramatically alters the way in which RICO and CCE cases are prosecuted, and
the recent cases that deal with the CFA reflect the magnitude of those changes.
Up to this point, only five courts have specifically addressed the issues surrounding
forfeiture of attorneys' fees.4 3 The scope of issues raised by the courts, as well
as the results of these cases, have varied widely,44 thus, strongly suggesting that
the controversy surrounding forfeiture of attorneys' fees will continue.
A. United States v. Rogers
The first court to consider the implications of the CFA on forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees was the United States District Court in Colorado in United States
v. Rogers.4 1 In Rogers, the defendants had been charged with violations of RICO
and a number of other offenses. Contemporaneous to the indictment, the govern-
ment filed a petition for an order to restrain the transfer or disposition of property
owned by the defendants. Counsel for the defendants objected to the restraining
order and filed a motion asking the court to exclude their attorney fees and costs
from forfeiture. The defendants based their argument on two alternative theories:
first, that the forfeiture amendments were not intended to apply to legitimate legal
services and, second, that the CFA violated their sixth amendment rights to counsel."'
The court initially examined the provision of the statute relating to assets
42 See S. REP. No. 225, note 26 at 3374-75.
-, United States v. Ianniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115 (CBM) (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985); United States
v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. One Parcel of Land, 614 F. Supp.
183 (N.D. I1l. 1985); United States v. Payden, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
767 F.2d 26 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Col. 1985).
" For instance, the court in One Parcel of Land upheld the forfeiture of attorneys' fees and
gave the right to counsel issue only prefunctory treatment. On the other hand, the court in Rogers
undertakes a complete statutory analysis. The Payden case considers the question in terms of a request
for fee information by the grand jury. Of the five reported cases, two, One Parcel of Land and Payden
would allow forfeiture of attorneys' fees. The others, the Rogers, Badalmanti, and lanniello courts
would reject forfeiture of attorneys' fees based on various grounds.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332.
Id. at 1334.
[Vol. 88
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss4/11
ATTORNEYS' FEES
transferred to third parties and determined that, in order to be immune from
forfeiture, a third party must be a bona fide purchaser without knowledge that
the property was subject to forfeiture.47 After citing the dictionary definition of
a bona fide purchaser," the court stated that an attorney who received fees in ex-
change for services performed gave value. However, a more troublesome question
remained as to whether the attorney had knowledge of the forfeitability of the prop-
erty. 9 The statute did not specifically address whether attorneys' fees were
forfeitable, therefore the court turned to the legislative history for clarification.
In analyzing the intent of the legislature, the court discussed the language of
a Senate Report. "An order of forfeiture may reach only property of the defen-
dant, save in those instances where transfer to a third party is voidable.""0 Fur-
thermore, the court quoted from the discussion concerning the definition of a bona
fide purchaser. The legislative history notes that "[t]he provision should be con-
strued to deny relief to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who
have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions." 5 ' Relying on this
language, the court concluded that legitimate attorneys' fees could not be forfeited,
since the fees were not paid as part of a scheme to avoid forfeiture.2
As further proof that Congress intended attorneys' fees to be exempt from
forfeiture, the court cited a comment from a House Judiciary Committee Report
which discussed similar legislation. 3 The Committee stated that "[n]othing in this
section is intended to interfere with a person's sixth amendment right to counsel." 5 '
The court compared the rendering of legal services to the compensation earned
by a doctor or grocer and determined that payment for legitimate services was not
intended to be included in forfeitable property."
The court then considered the defendants' sixth amendment claims. In the first
7 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1985).
43 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346.
19 The court recognized that knowledge of the contents of the indictment has been held to be
sufficient notice to the attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 133 (1984); Long, 654 F.2d at 917. Accord, Payden, 605 F. Supp. 839.
"' S. REP. No. 225, supra note 23 at 208.
" Id. at 209 n.47.
"2 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
" Id. The similar legislation involved amendments to the Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of
1984.
, H. R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 19 n.l (1984). The court did not cite the next sentence
of the quote, which may shed some light on the committee's meaning. The second sentence states "The
Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on the use of restraining
orders that impinge on a persons right to retain counsel in a criminal case." Id. Another court has
construed this quote to mean that Congress intended this issue be left open for the courts to resolve.
See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
" Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348. The court suggested that the right to an attorney may be a
"necessity of life," not unlike food, clothing, and shelter. Id. at n.5. See also United States v. Ray,
731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
1986]
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of these claims, the defendants argued that the threat of forfeiture prevented them
from securing counsel of their choice. 6 The government, on the other hand, con-
tended that the attorney could only avoid forfeiture by proving that the fees were
untainted. The court neither denied or accepted either claim, but instead relied on
its earlier conclusion that legitimate attorneys' fees were exempt from forfeiture."
The second claim by the defendants involved the section (m) hearing, which would
require the attorney to testify concerning the source of his fee to avoid forfeiture.
The defendants argued that this procedure would threaten the attorney-client
privilege. The court agreed with this position18 and found the information disclosed
at a section (m) hearing would go far beyond the scope of the privilege, thereby
chilling the open communication between attorney and client.5 9
Finally, the court addressed the impact of the CFA on the criminal justice
system. The court expressed concern over the growing cost and complexity of RICO
prosecutions and questioned whether a court appointed attorney could adequately
defend such charges. The court also suggested that the government could manipulate
the adversary process by systematically eliminating skilled defense lawyers through
a threat of forfeiture.6" The court then denied the government's restraining order
and granted the defendant's motion to exclude attorneys' fees from forfeiture.6 '
B. United States v. Payden
In United States v. Payden,62 the issue of forfeiture of attorneys' fees arose
in a completely different context. The defendant in Payden sought to quash a sub-
poena issued to his attorney by the grand jury. The grand jury was attempting
to elicit testimony concerning the defendant's fee arrangement with his attorney.
The defendant claimed the subpoena violated his sixth and fifth amendment rights.63
The district court was faced with the question of whether a defense attorney
would be "discouraged" from preparing a defense because of the threat of forfeiture
of his fee.6 ' In oral argument of the case, counsel for the defense had contended
that attorneys' fees were not forfeitable. Although this contention was not directly
at issue in the case, the court found it necessary to respond at length because the
purpose of the subpoena was to gather information that could be used at a later
date by the government at a hearing to forfeit attorneys' fees.6"
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1348. The court stated the argument in this manner "if counsel cannot
be paid, they will not work and clients will suffer." Id.
Id. at 1349.
" Id. Information related to fees may be privileged if disclosure of that information would tend
to implicate the client in a crime. See infra text accompanying notes 155-66.
' /d.
Id. at 1349-50.
Id. at 1351.
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 839.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 849 n.14.
[Vol. 88
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In its analysis, the court reviewed the reasoning of the court in Rogers and
strongly disagreed with many of its conclusions. An overriding concern of the court
was the potential for abuse if forfeitable property was allowed to be transferred
from client to lawyer. The court reasoned that immunity from forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees would allow lawyers to shield illegal laundering schemes by their
clients. 6 6 The court also questioned the Rogers court's interpretation of the legislative
history of the CFA. It observed that, because a defense attorney is put on notice
of forfeiture by the indictment, an attorney who accepted fees subject to forfeiture
could not have done so in an arm's length transaction. Therefore, the attorney
could not claim he was a bona fide purchaser without knowledge.
67
The court also refuted the argument that the defendant could not secure the
attorney of his choice because of the threat of forfeiture. Noting that the title to
forfeited assets is not resolved until after trial, the court pointed to the provisions
which place the assets in the hands of the government at the time the act is com-
mitted. In this court's view, third parties who took title to assets with knowledge
of their potential for forfeiture did so at their own risk.68 In addition, the court
challenged the Rogers court's reliance on the often-cited House Report, implying
that the statement was taken out of context. Instead, the court found that the issue
of sixth amendment rights had been purposely left open for the courts to resolve."
In conclusion, the court reiterated its position that exclusion of attorneys' fees
would foster illegal sheltering of funds and declined to allow suspect fees to be
used to pay for an attorney. As the court noted, "[A] defendant cannot obtain
a Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the
services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys from these same tainted funds." 70
C. United States v. One Parcel of Land
The government in United States v. One Parcel of Land" had filed a civil ac-
tion against the defendant's real estate, money, cars, and other property, alleging
these articles were subject to forfeiture pursuant to the CCE statute. The defen-
dant then moved to have his attorneys' fees and costs removed from the forfeiture
order. In defense of the motion, the defendant raised three basic issues: 1) that
attorneys' fees were not expressly mentioned in section 881 and therefore were not
forfeitable; 2) that the defendant's attorneys fell within the innocent owner excep-
tion; and 3) that the statute violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights. 72
Id. (quoting In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir. 1984)). See also Att'y subpoenas, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 32, col. 1 (lawyers aid criminal organizations in their illegal activities).
67 See infra text accompanying notes 115-22 for a discussion on whether an attorney could claim
he was a bona ide purchaser.
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14.
" Id. at 850 n.14.
71, Id.
" One Parcel of Land, 614 F. Supp. 183.
72 Id. at 185.
1986]
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In a simple, direct opinion, the District Court for the Northern District of Il-
linois denied the defendant's motion." The court examined the language of the
statute which provided that "all monies" used to facilitate or derived from drug
transactions were subject to forfeiture and determined that attorneys' fees fell within
the broad category of "monies." 7 The court then discussed the innocent owner
provision of the statute.15 The defendant's attorneys claimed they acquired an in-
terest in the property by performing legal services after the illegal act had taken
place. Therefore, they were innocent owners and exempt from forfeiture.76 The
court pointed to the relation back provision of the statute which operated to give
title to the government when the illegal act had occurred. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the fees, although in the hands of third parties, were still subject to
forfeiture. Furthermore, the court found that the attorneys could not have been
bona fide purchasers since they were aware of the forfeiture allegations through
the indictment. 77
Finally, the court dealt with the defendant's claim that his sixth amendment
rights had been violated. The court succinctly dealt with this issue, stating that
a defendant's choice of counsel may be dictated by economics.78 The court also
noted that appointed counsel is available in cases where the defendant is not able
to retain one. 79
D. United States v. Badalamenti
In declining to follow United States v. Payden,8' the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that attorneys' fees are not subject
to forfeiture and would probably violate the sixth amendment.82 In United States
v. Badalamentill the government issued a subpoena which required a defense at-
torney to disclose the defendant's fee records.83 The government contended this
information would provide evidence of illegal income which was necessary to prove
a criminal drug violation." The defendant moved to quash the subpoena, asserting
various claims including violations of the attorney-client privilege and the sixth
amendment right to counsel.85
71 Id. at 187.
I7 d. at 185. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
75 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6) (West Supp. 1985). The statute provides: "no property shall be
forfeited ... by reason of any act of ommission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."
76 Id. at 185-86.
71 Id. at 186.
71 See also lanniello, S. 85 Cr. 185, slip op. at 14; Rogers, 471 F. Supp. at 851.
7 Id. at 187.
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 839; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(b)(2)(B) (requiring evidence of substantial income).
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 195.
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The court held that Congress clearly did not intend to interfere with a defen-
dant's opportunity to obtain the counsel of his choice. After noting that a defen-
dant's attorney would likely be aware of the source of funds from which his fees
were paid,86 the court suggested that any prudent attorney would refuse to take
a RICO case, and even if he did take the case, he would subject himself to conflicts
of interest.8 7 Thus, the court concluded that a defendant in a RICO case would
have difficulty obtaining a lawyer if attorneys' fees were allowed to be forfeited.
The court construed the statute to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture, but noted
that, even if the attorneys' fees were intended by Congress to be forfeitable, the
statute interfered with an accused's right to counsel.88
E. United States v. lanniello
Forfeiture of attorneys' fees was also considered in another recent case in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York. In United States v. Ian-
niello,"9 the defendants were charged with RICO violations in connection with several
companies they owned and operated. The government sought and received an ex
parte restraining order prohibiting the disposition of certain property belonging
to the defendants, including their interest in the companies." The defendants re-
quested the court to distribute certain profits that the restrained companies earned
following the filing of the indictment. In addition, the defendants brought a mo-
tion to exclude attorneys' fees from forfeiture in order that they could be represented
by their chosen counsel. 9'
The court began its analysis -by examining the statute. The statute does not
explicitly provide for forfeiture of attorneys' fees, so the court turned to the
legislative history. In following the same analysis as the Rogers court," it found
that legitimate attorneys' fees were not forfeitable.
The court next addressed the defendants' sixth amendment rights. It found
that forfeiture of attorneys' fees would make it difficult to secure counsel because
the threat of the loss of his fee would make an attorney reluctant to handle the
case. 9" Furthermore, the court maintained that a court appointed attorney would
not be available to defendants who otherwise had money available to pay for an
attorney, even if that money was inaccessible. Therefore, the court reasoned that
a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel would be violated by the CFA.
The court cited other potential problems created by the forfeiture of attorneys'
But see infra text accompanying notes 167-76 for a discussion of possible conflicts of interest.
Id. at 196.
' Id. at 198.
lanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115.
' Id. at 3.
' Id. at 4.
" Id. at 6-7. See also text accompanying notes 50-55 for the Rogers court analysis of this issue.
lanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
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fees, including the chilling of the attorney-client relationship and violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The court found that forfeiture of attorneys'
fees affected the defendants' ability to prepare their legal defenses, which the court
deemed a violation of the sixth amendment."5
The last issue considered by the court was whether a portion of the retained
earnings from their corporation could be released so that the defendants could ob-
tain the counsel of their choice. The court pointed out that the restraining order
obtained by the government precluded the hiring of counsel. While the court realized
that economics will impose some limitations on the defendants' choices of counsel,
it asserted that depriving the defendants of the counsel of their choice would amount
to denying them- a "necessity of life." 96 The defendants' motion was therefore
granted. 7
IV. PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE CFA
As previously discussed, courts are now beginning to examine the sweeping
changes brought about by the enactment of the CFA. Forfeiture of attorney's fees
under the CFA creates substantial problems that need to be addressed. Although
it would be impossible to discuss in detail all of the issues raised by the courts,
several areas do warrant further attention.
A. Are Attorneys' Fees Forfeitable?
The CFA's relation back amendment was a deliberate attempt by Congress to
limit the transfer of forfeitable assets from the defendant to a third party.98 The
statutes are silent, however, on which assets once transferred are subject to for-
feiture. Some courts have construed the statute to include all property transferred
following the illegal act, including attorneys' fees. 99 Other courts have interpreted
the statute to apply to only those transactions with indicia of sham or fraud and
not to the legitimate rendering of legal services.'10 Thus, questions remain as to
whether Congress intended that atforneys' fees should be forfeitable and, sec-
ondarily, whether an attorney could be exempted from forfeiture by proving he
was a bona fide purchaser under the statute.
The penalty of forfeiture must first be examined in light of the overall pur-
poses of RICO and CCE. The legislative history of these statutes clearly dem-
onstrates Congress' concern over the increasing power and economic strength of
illegal organizations. '0, In enacting RICO for example, Congress declared, "It is
" Id. at 11-12.
- Id. at 14-15.
" d. at 17.
-" S. REP. No. 225, supra note 26 at 3378-79.
- See One Parcel of Land, 614 F. Supp. 183; Payden, 605 F. Supp. 839.
"' lanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, § 1 (1970).
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the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States . .. by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."' 0 2 In order to meet those
objectives, Congress stressed the need for new legal weapons to combat the prob-
lems. 03 Congress also directed that the statute was to be liberally construed."0
Since that time, the goals of the statute have been recognized and affirmed by the
Supreme Court. 05
In enacting the RICO and CCE statutes, Congress probably did not anticipate
that forfeitable property could encompass attorneys' fees. Prior to the CFA, how-
ever, several courts had been confronted with the question of whether a defendant
could be barred from using forfeitable assets to pay his attorney. In United States
v. Long, 06 the Third Circuit upheld the forfeiture of an airplane which had been
transferred to an attorney as payment of legal fees about six months before the
indictment of the defendant was filed. 0 7 This case was cited with approval in the
Senate Report describing the history of the CFA. 0 8 Similiarly, in United States
v. Raimondo,1'9 the Fourth Circuit allowed the forfeiture of attorneys' fees where
the funds were derived from the profits of the defendant's cocaine operation." 0
Finally, in United States v. Bello, " a district court dismissed the defendant's claim
that he would be denied counsel due to an order restraining his assets, stating that
the defendant could not use forfeitable assets to defend racketeering charges." 
2
However, none of these cases discussed the forfeiture of attorneys' fees in regard
to a violation of the sixth amendment.
The CFA amendments were an attempt to further enhance forfeiture proce-
dures in order to fully utilize their capacity to fight crime. The statute defines
assets that are in the hands of the defendant as absolutely forfeitable.' " However,
in subsection (c), Congress addresses property that is in the hands of third parties
by providing that "any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person
.. " may be subject to forfeiture." 4 The language used by Congress is clear and
unambiguous." 5 Attorneys' fees are not singled out for exemption from the stat-
I0 Id.
See S. REP. No. 91-617 at 76 (1969).
'" Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
'" See United States v. Turkette,-452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981).
Long, 654 F.2d at 911.
,, Id. at 916.
',' S. REP. No. 225, supra note 26 at 338 n.28.
'" Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476.
Id. at 478.
United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Calif. 1979).
11 Id. at 725.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West Supp. 1985).
M 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1985).
"' In Turkette, the Supreme Court stated: "In determining the scope of a statute, we look first
to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed leg-
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ute. Thus, within the plain meaning of the words, any forfeitable property trans-
ferred to an attorney is subject to the terms of the statute.
With the general goals of RICO and CCE in mind, disallowing forfeiture of
attorney's fees paid from the proceeds of criminal activity seems contrary to the
intent of Congress in enacting the CFA. If the statute is construed to exempt at-
torneys' fees from forfeiture, a defendant could use the proceeds of his criminal
activity to pay for his defense. A defendant could hire the attorney of his choice
who would be, in effect, subsidized by illegal funds. However, because at the time
of the illegal act title to the defendant's property vests in the government the
defendant's attorneys' fees would be paid out of government funds. In view of
the expressed intent of Congress to dismantle the economic base of these orga-
nizations, this result seems illogical.
Furthermore, an attorney who has accepted tainted fees could not claim he
was a bona fide purchaser. The CFA states that a third party may challenge a
forfeiture order by showing that he is a bona fide purchaser without cause to be-
lieve that the property was forfeitable." 6 Assuming that the attorney was not in-
volved in a fraudulent transaction,"17 the issue is whether the attorney could be
deemed to have knowledge of the government's interest in the assets. In most in-
stances, the attorney would have knowledge that a particular asset is forfeitable
at the time of the indictment or the government's application for a restraining
order. Some courts have held that knowledge of the indictment itself could con-
stitute notice to a third party."8 Still, actual notice may depend on how specific
an asset is described in the forfeiture count. If the property is specifically de-
scribed, then knowledge may be presumed. On the other hand, generic or general
statutory language may not be sufficient to inform the attorney that a particular
asset is forfeitable."19
Another method of meeting the "knowledge" requirement is to show that the
attorney knew the asset resulted from a prohibited activity. It is likely that an
attorney would discover the source of his fee in preparing the defense of his client. 121
islative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"' Id. at 580
quoting from Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
116 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1985).
"7 Several courts have expressed their concern over the use of lawyers laundering illegal money.
See Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14, citing Shargel, 742 F.2d 61. This subject is beyond the scope
of this Note.
"I See, e.g., Raimondo, 721 F.2d at 478; Long, 654 F.2d at 917. Also, under § 853(d), property
acquired during the period of violation where there was no other possible source is presumed to be
forfeitable. 21 U.S.C. § 853(d). This presumption should suffice to give notice to the attorney.
",9 See generally, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, Title 9 § 9-111.511. However, in a civil
forfeiture proceeding, assets subject to forfeiture must be specifically identified since the proceeding
is against the res.
'," In a criminal case, the attorney is ethically bound to investigate the case. MODEL CODE Or
PROFESSiONAL RESPONSuIEITY, EC 4-1 (1980) "A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of
the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system."
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Proof that the attorney knew of the forfeitability could also be obtained through
testimony at trial, from others involved in the same criminal activity, or by vol-
untary disclosure.'1' The evidence relevant to establish knowledge would neces-
sarily be resolved on a case by case basis.
Knowledge that the attorney knew the source of the illegal funds could also
be established through circumstantial evidence. Generally, facts concerning pay-
ment of attorneys' fees and the defendant's sources of income have been held to
be non-privileged.'2 Therefore, if the government could show that the accused
paid his attorney even though he had not held a paying job in the time period
alleged in the indictment, this evidence could be used to prove unexplained wealth.
23
In light of the above analysis, it seems doubtful that Congress contemplated
an exclusion for attorneys' fees from forfeiture. Absent any constitutional prob-
lems with this conclusion, 24 such an interpretation would contravene the purpose
behind the CFA. In addition, the majority of attorneys would have notice that
the fees were subject to forfeiture, either through the indictment or restraining
order. Therefore, the attorney would not be entitled to the bona fide purchaser
defense.
B. The Sixth Amendment and the CFA
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense." ' 25 As one court stated, "the sixth amendment right to counsel has
four different components: 1) the right to have counsel, 2) a minimum quality of
counsel, 3) a reasonable opportunity to select and be represented by chosen counsel
and 4) the right to a preparation period sufficient to secure minimum quality coun-
sel." 26 Of these four categories, two could arguably be impacted by forfeiture of
attorneys' fees under the CFA.
The sixth amendment unquestionably guarantees the right to have counsel in
federal criminal prosecutions. 27 Although much of the case law in this area has
dealt with the rights of indigents to have counsel appointed, 28 the right to have
counsel in criminal forfeiture cases arises in a different context. In forfeiture cases,
"2' UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL supra note 119 at § 9-111.512.
12' Shargel, 742 F.2d 61; In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hodg-
son, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974).
"-' See, e.g., In re Witnesses Before The Special March, 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1984) (subpoena for client's expenditures); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976),
vacated in part on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (evidence of substantial income from a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise); Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (evidence of unexplained wealth inconnection with
tax violations).
124 See lanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332.
'2' U.S. CONST. Amend. VI.
126 Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 232 (1984).
'-" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'' See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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this right involves the ability of a defendant to retain counsel due to the threat
of forfeiture of attorneys' fees following the conviction.
Sixth amendment problems could arise in cases in which a defendant is in-
dicted under either RICO or CCE and the government obtains a restraining or-
der. 29 In a scenario such as this, the defendant would then approach an attorney
to represent him. Fearing forfeiture, the attorney would conduct his own inves-
tigation to determine whether the assets used to pay his fee were legitimate. The
outcome of the scenario would depend upon the result of the investigation.
If a restraining order exists against all of the defendant's assets, funds will
not be available to pay the retainer. The prospective attorney would then be forced
to wait until the trial is over to collect his fees.'30 The uncertainty inherent in this
situation would force the attorney to question the source of the money in order
to ensure payment. If the attorney determined that the funds were tainted, he would
refuse to take the case, knowing that his fees would be seized. On the other hand,
if the attorney were satisfied that he could prove the funds were not obtained
through criminal activity, there would be no reason to deny representation.
Also implicit in the sixth amendment right to counsel is the opportunity of
the accused to select and be represented by counsel of his choice. 3 ' Recognition
of this right reflects protection of the defendant's prerogative to choose the way
in which he will present his defense.'3 2 Thus, "the defendant must be given a rea-
sonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to
be heard by counsel would be of little worth."' 3 Nevertheless, the right to counsel
of choice is not absolute,' 34 but must be balanced against the public's interest in
the prompt and efficient administration of justice. '3s
A survey of the case law in this area reveals that the denial of the right to
counsel of choice occurs mainly after counsel has been engaged to represent a
defendant. In situations where the defendant has asked for a continuance, 36 re-
,- See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (e) (West Supp. 1985). In
order to obtain a restraining order prior to the filing of an indictment, the government must prove:
1) that there is a substantial probability the government would prevail on the forfeiture issue, 2) that
failure to enter the order could diminish the property, and 3) that the need to preserve the property
outweighs the hardship. Id.
"2, See infra text accompanying notes 168-71.
' Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Chandler v. Freytag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954); Ur-
quhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-.
89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
Chandler, 348 U.S. at 10.
" Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir. 1984); Birt, 725 F.2d at 593; United States
v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).
' Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); Ur-
quhart, 726 F.2d at 1319; Burton, 584 F.2d at 489.
'- See, e.g., Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589-91 (1964); Gandy v. State, 569 F.2d 1318, 1324-
25 (5th Cir. 1978).
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quested permission to substitute counsel, 37 or revealed an attorney conflict of in-
terest,'38 the defendant's right to counsel of choice must be balanced against the
court's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases.3 9 However, the issue
of the right to counsel of choice in criminal forfeiture cases stems from a different
source. In those cases, a defendant's ability to choose counsel may be limited by
the amount of money he has to retain an attorney.
The claim that the right to counsel of choice depends on the financial re-
sources of the defendant is a novel argument. To date, only two courts have rec-
ognized and discussed this proposition. 40 In a real sense, however, economics will
always play a role in determining whom a defendant will engage as his attorney,
whether in a CFA forfeiture action or any other criminal action. A defendant's
desire to be represented by a particular attorney will be limited to those attorneys
he can afford. In this respect, forfeiture provisions are similar to other legal claims,
in that the limited resources of the defendant may jeopardize acceptance of the
case.
In forfeiture cases, the economic limitation will be in the form of a restraining
order obtained by the government.' 4' Consequently, it is the actions of the gov-
ernment which prevent the defendant from utilizing restricted funds to pay for
counsel of choice. No court as yet has recognized "any distinction between defend-
ants rendered indigent by circumstances of life and one who became indigent by
the actions of the government."'' 42 It remains to be seen if this argument will be
accepted by the courts.
C. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is essential to the adversarial system if the at-
torney is to fulfill his role as an advocate. 43 The purpose of the privilege is "to
encourage clients to make full discolsure to their attorneys"1' so that the client
" See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 908 n.2 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
599 (1984); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 183, 188 (3rd Cir. 1982); United States v. Hart, 557 F.2d
162, 163 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977).
"' United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978);
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
Powell, 287 U.S. at 59.
' Rogers, 471 F. Supp. at 851. "Economic realities impose one obvious limitation on the defend-
ant's right to be represented by a particular attorney." Id. fanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115, slip. op. at
14 (government's action in lawfully obtaining an ex parte restraining has created defendants' financial
inability to pay counsel of their choice).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(e) (West Supp. 1985).
142 E.g. United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957)
(rejecting distinction between an indigent and in a person who was rendered indigent by tax liens);
Bello, 470 F. Supp. at 725 (restraining order did not deprive defendant of counsel of choice). But see
lanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115, slip. op. at 14-15 (suggesting the contrary).
4,' 8 WIJMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) (discussing the premise behind the
attorney-client privilege).
" Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
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may obtain fully informed legal advice. In order to build an effective defense, the
attorney and client must be able to predict which conversations are privileged. 45
Furthermore, the adversarial system demands that the attorney for the defense
must be able to prepare his case unhindered by the government.'4
The attorney-client privilege does not shield all communications between at-
torney and client. In order to be protected by this privilege, the communication
must be made in confidence from a client to his attorney acting in his legal ca-
pacity. 47 The privilege does not apply if the communication was not meant to be
confidential 4 or if the attorney was not called upon to give legal advice. 49
1. Section (in) Hearings
After an order of forfeiture is entered in a CFA forfeiture case, a third party
is entitled to challenge the order through a section (in) proceeding." 0 Under the
statute, the burden is on the lawyer to prove he did not know that the property
was subject to forfeiture.' 5' However, this burden of proof can only be met by
violating the attorney-client privilege. In order to prove a claim,' the attorney
is forced to reveal much more than the simple fee arrangement. He is required to
disclose facts and circumstances to prove that the source of the fee is legitimate.
Because this information derives from confidential communications with his client,
the attorney is placed in the untenable position of choosing between his fee or his
client.
The ultimate effect of this situation is to "chill" the relationship between the
attorney and client. 53 If the client was aware that incriminating information could
be disclosed, he would be less likely to speak freely and openly with his attorney. 4
", Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). "[The attorney and client must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected." Id. at 393.
'I Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3rd
Cir. 1978).
' See WIGMOE, supra note 143 at § 2292.
E.g. United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Pipkins,
528 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976).
,,9 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Di-
versified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
'- 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (West Supp. 1985). Both
statutes call for essentially the same type of hearing. For convenience sake, we will refer to third party
ancillary hearings as "section (in)" hearings.
"'18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
The attorney-third party would have the burden of proving his fees were not forfeitable. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m)(6) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
"' See, e.g., In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir.),
vacated and withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982). (A subpoena issued to an attorney could cause
a wedge between the attorney and client); Shargel, 742 F.2d at 63, "[W]e would be less than candid not
to concede that the lack of a privilege against disclosure of the fact of an attorney relationship may
discourage some persons from seeking legal advice at all." Id.
"14 But, Cf. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403; Shargel, 742 F.2d at 62; Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & John-
son, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Calif. 1976).
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Thus, the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective representation may be
violated by the section (m) hearing.
2. Disclosure of Fee Information
It is likely that an attorney may be called upon to testify about the source of
his fee during a CFA forfeiture case.'" Depending on the jurisdiction, this in-
formation may or may not be protected under the attorney-client privilege. Vir-
tually all jurisdictions recognize the rule that information regarding fees is not
privileged. 5 6 However, in special circumstances, some courts have taken the ap-
proach that the attorney-client privilege applies to any fee information which might
tend to incriminate the client.' 5 7 In those jurisdictions, the attorney would be pro-
hibited from disclosing any information regarding his fee arrangement with a client.
This could have serious consequences for an attorney seeking to recover his fees
in a section (m) hearing.
The source of this rule originates from a Ninth Circuit case, Baird v. Ko-
erner.' 8 In Baird, an attorney representing a client, who wished not to be iden-
tified, sent a check to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 59 The IRS sought to
have the client's identity revealed.' 60 The Ninth Circuit held that the identity of
the client was privileged because disclosure of the client's identity could have linked
the individual to a crime. Therefore, this information was a confidential com-
munication protected by the attorney-client privilege.
16
'
Eventually the incrimination theory evolved into whether disclosure of fee in-
formation "would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal
advice is sought.' 1 62 Although this exception to the attorney-client privilege has
recently been called into question in the Ninth Circuit, 63 courts as recently as the
Rogers opinion have recognized and applied the incrimination theory.
64
It is possible that courts adhering to this theory would find that disclosure
See Att'y subpoena, supra note 66 (citing skyrocketing number of lawyers subpoenaed).
is6 See In re Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d at 492; Shargel, 742
F.2d at 62; United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489,
494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
' The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied this rule although
the Ninth Circuit has recently called the rule into question. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Twist),
689 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982);
Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005, United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); Hodgson,
492 F.2d 1175; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 631 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1083 (1981).
,, Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
"' Id. at 626.
') Id. at 627.
' Id. at 633.
Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1353.
Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
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of fee information would violate a defendant's sixth amendment rights. This is
especially true where disclosure of fees would go to prove substantial income, an
essential element of some crimes.165 In RICO and CCE prosecutions, evidence of
a defendant's assets may be central to proving the government's case.166 Thus, injurisdictions that have expanded the scope of the attorney-client privilege to in-
clude fee information, attorneys seeking to recover their fees may find they cannot
admit evidence of the fee arrangement.
D. Other Conflicts
Several moral and ethical problems are raised by subjecting attorneys' fees to
forfeiture. Although these problems have been alluded to earlier, they are worth
discussing in detail. A lawyer who has accepted a forfeiture case may find that
his actions have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. An attorney has
a duty to represent his client zealously, 67 yet his actions may conflict with the Code.
As has been previously stated, if an attorney accepts a case where the defend-
ant hag no current assets to pay his fee, the attorney must wait until the end of
the trial to obtain payment. If the defendant is found guilty, his assets will be
forfeited,' 6' and the attorney will not be paid. 69 Thus, the payment of the fee
depends on the outcome of the trial.' 7' This situation is not unlike a contingent
fee in civil cases and could be construed as such.' 7' In taking the case, the attorney
has set himself up for possible ethical violations.
Furthermore, the conflict between representing the client and the Code of
Professional Responsibility becomes even more apparent when a plea bargain is
offered. The lawyer has a duty to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of his client. 72 On the other hand, the attorney has a financial interest in
avoiding the loss of his fee. The attorney is placed in a Catch 22 position. If he
recommends a guilty plea, he will be able to keep his fee. However, he may be
I" See 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 1962. E.g. Sherman, 627 F.2d at 190-192 (disclosure
of amount of attorney fees in IRS investigation); Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (attorney fees evidence of
substantial income).
" See supra text accompanying note 123.
',' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 7.
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a).
' But see note 187 for a discussion of possible recovery of fees under the Criminal Justice Act.
A lawyer is prohibited from acquiring a financial interest in the outcome of criminal litigation.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103, EC 5-7 (1981).
"' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1981) states: "a lawyer shall not
enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a
criminal case."
'2" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 5 (1981).
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accused of financial self interest.17 1 In either circumstance, his decision would be
subject to intense scrutiny.
Thus, representation of a client in a CFA forfeiture case would inevitably re-
sult in a conflict of interest which would impair the defendant's right to effective
representation. One court has suggested a bifurcated trial or the use of civil for-
feiture provisions to cure the problems.' 74 However, one of the main purposes of
the CFA was to consolidate all claims against forfeitable assets in order to expedite
the judicial process. 75 At this point it is uncertain how the demands of the statute
can be met without violating the defendant's right to conflict-free counsel.
V. SOLUTIONS
As it currently stands, the CFA creates a tension between the objectives of
the statute and the rights of a defendant. The intent behind the CFA is admirable
and should be pursued; however, Congress must balance the aims of the statute
against the effect it could have on the criminal justice system. 76 In order for the
statute to function as it was designed, courts must recognize the premise that all
property transferred to third parties may be subject to forfeiture. 7 7 This includes
legal services that have been paid for with illegal monies. On the other hand, the
statute must foster the role of the defense attorney in the criminal defense system'
7
1
and, in turn, strive to protect his fee. These goals could be accomplished in several
ways.
As it is now written, the CFA places an unwritten affirmative duty on the
attorney to question the defendant as to the source of his fee before accepting
representation. 7 This duty arises from the nature of the statute. The attorney
must be certain that the source of his fee is legitimate or risk losing them through
"I See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101. "A lawyer should refuse
employment when his own interest may impair his independent professional judgment."
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
" S. REP. No. 225, supra note 26 at 3379.
See generally Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising
the Stakes, 22 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 747 (1985); Kreiger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the
New Law, 22 Art. CRIM. L. REV. 737 (1985).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 101-115. But see, lanniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115, slip. op.
at 7-8; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
"I See generally Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right
to Counsel, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1984); Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure,
Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1982).
"I See Janniello, No. S. 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 11. "Defense counsel might question defendant
prior to accepting representation in order to determine whether the money to be paid for the legal fee
came from legitimate sources as opposed to illicit undertakings." Id.
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forfeiture. The prudent attorney will verify the source of his fee before committing
himself to defend the case.
During the initial interview, the attorney should inform the prospective client
of the law and that he is required to substantiate the source of his fee. 80 The at-
torney should make an independent investigation in order to confirm the infor-
mation so that his fee is protected from forfeiture. In some situations, verification
could be made easily, such as confirming a person's salary or personal holdings.
However, in other circumstances, establishing which monies are untainted could
prove to be a difficult problem. In any case, the attorney must be able to bring
forth enough evidence to substantiate the source of the fee, or risk forfeiture. 8 '
Several reasons support the requirement that the attorney verify his fee. If fees
could be forfeited only if the attorney participates in a scheme to transfer for-
feitable assets, this would lessen the attorney's incentive to investigate his client's
case. The less he knew about his client's affairs, the better chance he would have
of retaining his fee. Placing the burden on the attorney would discourage delib-
erate blindness and shift the burden to the defense counsel to ensure compliance
with the goals of the CFA.
Secondly, it would also dissuade attorneys from involving themselves in illegal
laundering schemes that have been mentioned by several courts. 82 There is evi-
dence that some lawyers work closely with organized crime. 83 Lawyers would be
under an affirmative duty to investigate their fees, thereby reducing the risk of
immunity from criminal acts. The system would benefit from lifting the shield off
this type of activity.
The duty to investigate should attach at the time of the indictment, because
at that time the government is required to give notice that it intends to forfeit the
defendant's assets. 84 Following notice by indictment, the government would seek
to restrain those assets it believed were subject to forfeiture. In order to receive
a restraining order, the government must demonstrate with substantial probability
that it could prevail at trial that the assets were traceable to illegal acts.'85 Thus,
at the indictment stage, the attorney should have sufficient notice of the forfeiture,
and it is at this stage that the duty would be established. Attorneys representing
"" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 states "A lawyer should exert his best
efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations."
--- See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (West Supp. 1985).
1"2 See Shargel, 742 F.2d at 64; Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14. See also Lawyers and Organized
Crime, NAT. L. J., Sept. 24, 1984 at 1, col. 3.
'"' See Att'y subpoena, supra note 63 at 32, col. I; Mob Defenders: As corrupt as their Clients?,
A.B.A. J., July 85 at 32-33.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (c)(2).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e) (West Supp. 1985); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(e) (West Supp. 1985).
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a defendant at the pre-indictment stage would be entitled to reasonable attorneys'
fees awarded by the court.
86
The defendant who is unable to retain counsel with his own funds has another
available alternative. In circumstances where a restraining order bars the defend-
ant's ability to pay counsel, the accused is eligible for appointed counsel under
the Criminal Justice Act. 87 Under this Act, the court is entitled to appoint counsel
if the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel. 8  The court examines the
defendant's financial capacity, 89 including his access to funds available to pay an
attorney. 90 It seems clear that a defendant whose monies were restricted by a gov-
ernment restraining order would be entitled to court-appointed representation.
Once the attorney has determined that representation is possible, a method to
establish the legitimacy of his fee would be necessary. Currently, the only pro-
cedure available to an attorney to recover his fee is through a section (m) hear-
ing.19' However, the attorney-client privilege threatens the effectiveness of this third-
party remedy. 92 A viable solution to this problem would be to create an exception
to the attorney-client privilege in this instance.
A statutory exception would allow the attorney to testify on the stand at a
section (m) hearing concerning the source of his fee. The exception would be lim-
ited to testimony relating to the attorneys' fees only, and would not extend to
other information covered by the attorney-client privilege. If the attorney had
properly determined that the fees were not tainted at the indictment stage, he would
not be required to divulge any incriminating evidence against his client. This lim-
ited exception would guarantee the defense attorney the right to defend his fee
- It is entirely possible that the attorney commenced representation prior to the filing of the
indictment. If we assume that the duty to investigate would not attach until notice was given by in-
dictment, then the attorney is entitled to compensation for services rendered up to that point, whether
or not the fees were tainted.
What is not clear is whether an attorney could be eligible for appointment following trial. For
example, if the attorney undertook representation in the expectation of recovering his fee pursuant to
a section (in) hearing, but he was unable to establish the legitimacy of his fee and consequently
they were forfeited. It may be possible for the attorney to apply for retroactive appointment under
the CJA. The act states "Such appointment may be made retroactive to include any representation
furnished pursuant to the plan prior to appointment." 18 U.S.C. 3006A(b) (1985). Thus, technically
the attorney could receive compensation by filing for attorneys fees prior to trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b).
"I Indigency is not a necessary requirement to obtain appointed counsel. The defendant need only
show that adequate legal representation is beyond his means. United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124
(8th Cir. 1969).
" United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 262, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973); United States v. Con-
iam, 574 F. Supp. 615 (D.C. Conn. 1983).
'' 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).
1'- See supra text accompanying notes 150-154.
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without violating his ethical obligation to his client. This scenario also presumes
that the client is aware of this proceeding.
A final problem could be solved by requiring that no plea bargain could in-
clude payment of attorneys' fees. Due to the large numbers of defendants who
enter into plea bargains, 93 a defense attorney who recommends a plea bargain to
his client may also be ensuring the payment of his own fee. By denying prosecutors
the opportunity to put counsel in a position of conflict, the problem could be avoided.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of the CFA is an admirable attempt by Congress to reshape the
law and procedures in the area of criminal forfeiture. The Act reflects Congress'
bipartisan support for escalating the war on crime, while strengthening the weap-
ons of law enforcement. Unfortunately, as in many legislative projects of this kind,
the CFA also contains unanticipated problems which could undermine the utility
of the statute. As in the past, the courts will be faced with the challenge of bal-
ancing the rights of the defendant against the needs of the criminal justice system.
In the case of the CFA, this process is just beginning. However, with proper ju-
dicial intervention and some slight modifications, many of these problems may be
overcome.
"I See H. MILLER, W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 16-
24 (1978).
[Vol. 88
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss4/11
